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1. Introduction 
 In 2005, the Xbox 360, the second generation of Microsoft’s popular game console, hit 
the shelves at electronic stores across the country. Outside the stores, game buffs lined up to be 
the first in the door when the Best Buys or Circuit Citys opened. The consoles sold out, and 
Microsoft was left with thousands of unsatisfied orders. The previous year, a similar event took 
place during the holiday buying bonanza, but this time it was Sony’s PlayStation 2. Sony said 
that “[c]onsumer demand for the new console has exceeded our expectations, and we are doing 
all we can to fulfill the wish list of people who want a new console under their tree this holiday 
season” (Harford 1). Indeed, the sellout popular toy is a recurring theme during the holiday 
season. Some of the more famous episodes include the Cabbage Patch Kids craze of 1983, the 
1988 Nintendo game cartridge parental panic, Tickle Me Elmo’s spotlight début in 1996, and 
1998’s Furby frenzy, where the strange owl-like electronic creature retailed for $35 but was 
often sold in the secondary market for upwards of $100 (“What is a Furby”). Alexander Tabarrok 
dubbed this the “hot-toy problem.” He asks, “News accounts often remark on the high prices 
found in the resale market compared to the shortages at the regular price, so why cannot the 
manufacturing firm, rather than the resalers, capture the extra profits?” (513). Many answers 
have been suggested, from the most straightforward argument that shortages create a positive 
hype effect and generate free publicity, to more complex game theoretic models of seller-induced 
excess demand and intentional mispricing (Brandenburger 113). Tabarrok himself offers an 
intriguing double-edged argument. First, he contends that a larger shortage implies a more elastic 
demand curve, and therefore, the lost profit to the retailer or manufacturer from maintaining the 
bellow equilibrium price is actually less than what we would think at first glance. Second, he 
notes that retailers are concerned that if they raise price during the peak demand pre-Christmas 
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period, customers will return the popular item after the holiday season when price has fallen back 
down, only to buy it again at the lower price. The first part of Tabarrok’s argument is the main 
focus of this paper. If we can establish that a large shortage does not necessarily mean that 
handsome profits are being left untapped, the various theories of the hot-toy problem become 
more plausible because the opportunity cost of the shortage is smaller (Tabarrok 515). 
Supporting Tabarrok’s argument, a more general peak demand theory that does not apply 
specifically to shortages, is the elasticity theory, which holds that when demand for a specific 
item increases, consumers will focus less on minimizing travel costs and more on finding the 
lowest price such that they become more price sensitive and the demand curve more elastic. If 
this is true, then as demand rises for a hot toy, potentially resulting in a shortage, we would 
expect the demand curve to also become more elastic, hence, supporting Tabarrok’s argument of 
elastic demand in the face of demand-induced shortages. Rather than try to provide an answer to 
the entire hot-toy problem, I will address the elasticity theory and show that we do in fact 
observe greater price sensitivity during higher demand periods, thus lending credence to 
Tabarrok’s reasoning, and subsequently confirming many of the hot-toy theories.  
 My method of testing the elasticity theory is somewhat irregular, the key element being 
the use of the dispersion of final bid prices as a measurement of consumer price sensitivity. 
Furthermore, my definition of price dispersion is unconventional in that I am considering the 
dispersion of prices consumers paid for individual items rather than the prices offered by 
individual sellers. I use the very popular Zhu Zhu pet hamster Pipsqueak as my tool of 
observation. The toy faced shortages at many of the major brick and mortar and online toy 
outlets during the 2009 holiday season and was the most recent iteration of the hot-toy problem. 
To keep the data collection manageable I focused only on online sales of the Pipsqueaks. I used 
 Clair 4 
 
movements in completed auction prices on eBay to estimate the direction of movements in 
consumer willingness to pay, and subsequently the direction of movements in demand. I could 
then compare changes in the dispersion of completed auction final prices to estimated 
movements in demand. I used the day-by-day coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided 
by mean) as an estimator for elasticity under the reasoning that as price sensitivity increases, 
shoppers’ willingness to search for the lowest priced item should increase; therefore, we should 
see a smaller spread in the final auction prices since more price sensitive shoppers will more 
often not bid on an already expensive auction, but instead, search for, find, and bid up auctions 
with lower highest bids. I was able to compare price dispersion across pre- and post-Christmas 
data, between higher and lower estimated demand periods, and between weekdays and 
weekends. I found that price dispersion appears to rise after Christmas, and that in the highest 
peak demand period, the coefficient of variation is 26.24 percent below the entire sample 
average. I do not, however, find substantial evidence of a weekend effect on demand. Hence, my 
results offer evidence supporting the elasticity theory and Tabarrok’s elasticity argument, and 
conclude that the opportunity cost of the large shortages repeatedly exhibited by the hot-toy 
problem may in fact be small. 
   The paper will proceed as follows: Section 2 covers the previous literature, giving a 
more in-depth description of Tabarrok’s points, and running through a number of the peak-
demand and prevailing theories regarding the hot-toy problem.  Section 3 gives a thorough 
discussion of the elasticity theory and its applicability to online retail and eBay. In Section 4, the 
data, the collection method, and my reasoning for choosing the Zhu Zhu pets as the case study 
toy are explained. Section 5 presents some descriptive statistics of the data, and Section 6 offers 
a discussion of the determination of the peak, or most-peak demand period. Section 7 explains 
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the method of comparing price dispersion across peak and non- or lesser peak periods and 
describes the results. Section 8 concludes.  
 
2. Theories of Peak Demand and the Hot-Toy Problem 
Tabarrok challenges the classical notion of a large shortage. The typical determination of 
a large shortage depends on the difference between quantity demanded, QD, and quantity 
supplied, QS—the larger the difference the greater the shortage. Consider the first graph in Figure 
1. Suppose there are two goods, a and b, with demand curves Da and Db respectively, each with a 
fixed short term supply QS. At a price of PC, conventional measures show good a with a 
significantly larger shortage than good b. However, Tabarrok asks for which good a shortage 
would result in greater profit loss. The answer in this case reverses to good b—consider the 
second graph in Figure 1. “The loss in profit is smaller the larger the shortage,” says Tabarrok, 
“because a large shortage is a sign, ceteris paribus, of an elastic demand curve.” Thus, contrary 
to conventional wisdom, a large shortage implies that a relatively small increase in price would 
eliminate the shortage but result in a minimal gain in profit to the retailer or manufacturer. Under 
the elasticity theory, increases in demand increase price elasticity, in other words as the demand 
shifts out, it also becomes flatter. Picture this: Toy A becomes a fad, overall demand shifts out 
mainly thanks to the customers who are fairly elastic, the manufacturer raises price slightly and 
the market clears, leaving it with only slightly more short-term profits and a toy that is no longer 
the news-making hit of the season. A smart manufacturer may keep price low, foregoing a little 
short-term profit to enjoy the other benefits of having a sellout product. Thus, if Tabarrak is 
indeed correct, many of the following proposed answers for the hot-toy problem become more 
plausible. 
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Several simple solutions have been presented to answer the question posed by the hot-toy 
problem. Brandenburg and Nalebuff offer perhaps the simplest answer, contending that a large 
shortage in a particular product creates hype, or buzz, and free publicity. Taborrak finds this 
theory unconvincing. “The buzz theory would work better if the shortage occurred before 
Christmas only to disappear as Santa approached,” says Tabbarrok, “but that is not what 
typically happens” (513). Media buzz only helps if it ultimately results in high profits down the 
road—being out of stock exactly when everyone wants your product does little good. The case 
could be made, however, that the benefit to the manufacturer from the hype effect might come in 
the form of high sales continuing long after Christmas. Moreover, if the product was a collectors’ 
item, like Beanie-Babies, or had complementary products, like games for a Wii, the hype effect 
might lead to greater purchases of the complementary goods after Christmas. Regardless, this 
theory is made more convincing if the foregone profit from maintaining the shortage is minimal. 
A second simple theory, just the reverse of the hype theory, is that an increase in the price would 
generate bad publicity, hurting a manufacturer’s or retailer’s reputation and sales of other 
products (Harford 2). However, this requires a somewhat capricious distinction between good 
press and bad press. 
Haddock and McChesney (1994) make a customer loyalty argument that, faced with a 
supply or demand shock that would temporarily create a shortage at the current price level, a 
firm may decide to ride out the shortage rather than increase price in the short term, avoiding 
inducing long standing customers to look for substitutes. The firm’s concern in this case is that 
by raising their price to the market clearing level, they may induce some otherwise loyal 
customers to resort to substitutes with which they may build a relationship and not return to the 
original product or brand once the transitory shock has passed. The challenge for the firm if they 
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ride out the shortage is to ensure that the scarce good is allocated first to loyal customers. It is 
debatable whether this theory can apply to popular toys, since the hot-toy problem strictly 
involves new items that require only a one-time purchase. The firm and the customers would not 
have built up a relationship, nor would they need to. Instead, Haddock and McChesney’s theory 
is more applicable to markets like restaurants in France facing tourist based demand shocks, or 
the airline industry overbooking flights, or newspapers running a particularly hot story but 
selling for the same price. Nevertheless, if we can determine that a demand-induced shortage 
represents only a small loss in profit under Tabarrok’s reasoning, Haddock and McChesney’s 
theory gains more validity. 
DeGraba (1995) puts together a game theoretic model of buying frenzies and the 
rationale for seller-induced excess demand. He considers a good produced by a monopolist for 
which consumers do not yet know their personal valuation but do know the true distribution of 
valuations. Suppose, the good is produced at zero marginal cost, and there are 100 risk neutral 
customers who each demand one unit. Suppose half the customers will value the good at $1.00 
and the other half at $0.60. However, in period one, the customers only know the distribution of 
valuations and not their own valuations. In period two, they know their valuations. Hence, in 
period one, the customers have an expected valuation of $0.80. Now, assume the monopolist 
produces only 99 units in period one, and credibly commits to producing no units in period two. 
If the monopolist charges a price of $0.79, any consumer who believes that all other consumers 
will purchase the item in period one, will also purchase in period one because waiting till period 
two would leave him with nothing to buy. Thus, all consumers will purchase in period one, 
creating excess demand at a higher price than the profit maximizing price the monopolist would 
be able to charge in period two. 
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DeGraba’s model is a particularly useful way of considering the hot-toy problem since 
the model requires a product with little current consumer information about personal willingness 
to pay. Consumers need to be uninformed in the first period, when the toy hits the shelves in 
October or November, and not become informed until period two, after Christmas once lots of 
people have already bought the toy. Moreover, DeGraba’s model goes hand in hand with the 
hype theory—the more press something gets about being sold out, the more likely shoppers will 
believe all other shoppers are buying in period one, and thus they themselves buy in period one, 
continuing the cycle of sellout-hype-sellout without new customers having yet learned their 
actual valuation of the item. 
Interestingly, in DeGraba’s model, if the monopolist were to raise the price in period one 
above customers’ expected valuation, the monopolist would lose the entire period one demand, 
as all customers would wait to buy till the second period when they learned their valuation. This 
implies a highly elastic demand curve when price is near period one expected valuation. 
However, an exogenous upward shift in the demand curve would move the expected valuation 
further above price, ceteris paribus, decreasing the point elasticity. Therefore, we actually have 
the opposite hypothesis for DeGraba’s theory—observing more elastic demand at a higher 
demand level supplies evidence against the theory. 
   Tabarrok himself offers a simple answer to the hot-toy problem which he calls the 
“Return-Policy Theory” (515). Retailers often offer a generous return policy, allowing customers 
to bring back a product they decide they do not want for a full refund. Tabarrok says that “If the 
hot toy increases in price whenever there is a seasonal shortage…retailers open themselves up to 
be gamed by consumers, consumers who purchase at the high price will be motivated to return 
the product only to buy it again at the lower post-shortage price” (515). Retailers could 
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potentially make exceptions to their policy during certain periods, but new policies can be 
expensive and hard to enforce. The Return-Policy Theory is yet another case that becomes more 
plausible if we can establish that the opportunity cost of keeping price below the market clearing 
level is not particularly huge. 
Broadening the scope slightly, stepping away from the restriction of a shortage scenario, 
and aside from the elasticity theory, there are two main theories of pricing strategy during peak 
demand periods. 
The tacit collusion theory states that we do not see price increases—and might even see 
price decreases—during peak demand periods because the benefits to tacit collusion break down 
and the collusive agreement becomes less sustainable (Chevalier 3). Chevalier, Kashyap and 
Rossi (2000) make the case:  
[T]acit collusion is sustainable when the gains from defection in the current period are 
low relative to the expected future cost of being punished for the defection. The 
temptation to cheat from a collusive arrangement is highest during a temporary demand 
spike, because the gain from cheating is increasing in current demand, while the loss 
from future punishment increases in future demand. (4) 
Regarding the hot-toy problem, this theory only applies to retailers, since the manufacturing end 
of a hit toy is usually monopolistic. We can consider the situation of two competing retailers 
selling the same item. Assume a simultaneous, repeating game where each retailer can either 
choose to sell the item at the collusive profit maximizing price, or cheat on the collusive 
agreement and charge a lower price. Also assume a grim trigger strategy is employed by both  
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retailers. Collusion is sustainable as long as 
(ПCOLL – ПNE) δ / 1 – δ     >     ПDEV – ПCOLL 
where, ПCOLL is a firm’s profit from sustaining the price collusion, ПNE is a firm’s profit at the 
Nash equilibrium, ПDEV is the one period profit from cheating on the collusive agreement by 
cutting price, and δ is the discount rate of future periods (Chevalier 11). In a relatively higher 
demand period, ПDEV increases by more than ПCOLL or ПNE, making cheating relatively more 
attractive. If more retailers choose to cheat in higher demand periods, then an increase in demand 
does not necessarily lead to higher prices in the short term. If applied to the hot-toy problem, this 
theory also gains validity through Tabarrok’s argument—the less profit that a higher price offers 
the more likely retailers will be to price low and increase market share. The problem with the 
tacit collusion theory is its questionable applicability to the hot-toy problem. Cheating on a tacit 
agreement involves under-pricing ones competitor(s) to steal customers and market share. But 
the hot-toy problem is a case of shortages. If a retailer is out of stock, under-pricing its 
competition does no good since it will not result in any additional sales, only smaller margins. 
Moreover, the tacit collusion theory is unable to describe manufacturer behavior since the maker 
of a sell-out toy is usually the only company making that toy. 
 In the loss-leader model, if retailers advertise their prices (or consumers are aware of the 
prices at various stores without having to go to the stores), then it is most efficient for the 
retailers to advertise and make a low price commitment on the highest demand items (Chevalier 
4). Firms thereby can draw customers to their stores to buy the low priced item that is in high 
demand, and once there, the customers will ideally save themselves travel costs by completing 
the rest of their shopping needs at the same store. For the manufacturer, a loss-leader strategy 
only makes sense in a case by case basis. For Furby or Tickle-Me Elmo, consumers demand only 
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one, and once it is purchased their demand is zero. For game consoles like Xbox, or even for the 
recent hit Zhu Zhu Pets which have lots of potential amenities, the manufacturer may see loss-
leader benefits—once the game console or hamster has been purchased, the buyer’s demand for 
Xbox games or the “Hamster Fun House,” etc., may go up. However, the applicability of the 
loss-leader model to the hot-toy problem is also debatable. No matter how low the price is, a 
popular item will not bring shoppers into a store if the store has no stock to sell. It may bring a 
crowd the day it is in stock—said one Slate article about the Xbox shortage, “Gaming enthusiasts 
camp[ed] outside electronic stores, desperate to buy the hot new game console…Best Buy enjoys 
the crowds”—but what about the following week when Best Buy is completely out of stock? 
That is not bringing in a crowd. Moreover, it is dubious that the manufacturer can generate 
additional sales of complementary products with a below equilibrium price—that would imply, 
for example, that those willing to buy the game console at a higher price were also those who 
demanded fewer games for it. Nevertheless, if it can be determined that charging the market 
clearing price results in only a small gain in short-term profits over current shortage prices, the 
loss-leader model becomes a more likely hypothesis.  
 
3. The Elasticity Theory Explained and Applied to Online Retail and eBay 
 Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2000) discuss the general foundation of the elasticity 
theory: “With a fixed cost of searching, it is optimal to search more during high purchasing 
periods. This makes consumers more price-sensitive when overall demand is high” (3). During a 
shopping spree, or an exogenously high demand period, a shopper may be out to buy a number 
of goods and will see more prices and more stores, becoming better informed and thus making 
low price purchases easier. For example, say Elaine, George, and Jerry each just had twins, and 
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now Cosmo has to buy clothes as gifts for all six children. Cosmo’s demand for baby clothes is 
usually x, but now it is 6x, so that finding the lowest price on baby clothes is worth much more to 
him, and therefore may be worth extra searching. Instead of just going to Babies “R” Us like 
usual, now he also goes to Target and K-Mart and finds that the clothes are cheapest at K-Mart, 
but the toy that Cosmo wanted to get for his own kid is cheapest at Target. Cosmo has a greater 
incentive to be more informed about prices, which leads him to be more price sensitive and his 
demand curve for baby products more elastic. Extrapolating this across the entire population 
during exogenously high demand periods such as the holiday shopping season, we can imagine a 
scenario where all consumers become more knowledgeable about prices, more price sensitive, 
the demand curve that retailers face flattens out, price dispersion decreases, and maybe prices 
even fall as markets become more competitive. 
 Warner and Barsky (1995) collected daily pricing data of eight products across 17 retail 
outlets in Ann Arbor, Michigan, between November 1, 1987, and February 29, 1988 (325). They 
found that prices tended to be lower on weekends (this result was robust but economically 
small), and found that sales (price cuts) were more frequent before Christmas than after, 
supplying evidence supporting the elasticity theory—retailers have to price more competitively 
in the face of more elastic demand.  
To conceptualize Cosmo’s abstract game, Warner and Barsky use a “circular city” Salop 
model (345). I find a simple Hotelling model to be just as effective as it offers the same general 
analysis and result. Suppose there are two stores with k people uniformly distributed between the 
stores. Store 1 and Store 2 sell the same product at prices p1 and p2 respectively. For a customer 
located at t, the travel cost to Store 1 is t and to Store 2 is k – t, where t is some integer from 1 to  
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k. Thus, a consumer is indifferent between shopping at the two stores when 
p1q + t = p2q + (k – t), 
where q is the quantity of the good that each consumer exogenously purchases per period. Thus, 
the shopper indifferent between the stores is located at 
t* = (p2q – p1q + k)/2. 
If we assume each store’s marginal cost is zero, the profit of each store is 
Π1 = p1qt  and   Π2 = p2q(k – t), 
and substituting, 
Π1 = p1q[(p2q – p1q + k)/2]   and  Π2 = p2q[k – (p2q – p1q + k)/2]. 
Maximizing profit based on price, the best response functions are 
p1 = p2/2 + k/2q  and  p2 = p1/2 + k/2q,  
and the Cournot equilibrium is 
p1 = p2 = k/q, 
which shows clearly that as the quantity that each shopper is out to buy, q, increases, the 
equilibrium price falls. 
 We know quantity demanded equals tq, or 
q[(p2q – p1q + k)/2]. 
To illustrate the rise in elasticity with a greater q, assume k = 100, q = 10, and q1 = q2 = 10. Store 
1 faces a total demand of 500. If Store 1 raised their price to 11, they would see a 10% fall in 
demand to 450. However, if q = 20 instead, the same one unit price increase would change total 
quantity demanded at Store 1 from 1000 to 800, a 20% fall in demand. 
 If we, however, consider the online market, the story is somewhat different. Instead of 
traveling to Store 1 vs. Store 2 to buy all q, the consumer can simply send them an electronic  
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message to mail x amount of y—travel costs are zero. A consumer’s indifferent property is now 
simply 
p1q = p2q 
and exogenous movements in q have no influence on which store a consumer would rather 
purchase from. Since there are many more than two stores online, finding which has the lowest 
price can be a time consuming process. We can therefore imagine a search cost mechanism that 
replaces the travel cost of the Hotelling model.  
 Pan, Ratchford and Shankar (2002) supply strong evidence that, despite its apparent ease, 
accessibility, and minimal time cost, online search mechanisms make the online marketplace no 
more competitive and price dispersion no narrower than we see at brick-and-mortar stores.  
It has been hypothesized that the online medium and the internet lower search costs, 
making more price information available to buyers and electronic markets more 
competitive than conventional markets…Contrary to this expectation, however, Bailey 
(1998), Clemons et al. (2002), and Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) have all found that 
price dispersion in electronic markets is substantial and no narrower than in conventional 
markets. (433) 
Pan et al. question the results of these other studies since they did not control for potential price-
influencing services or attributes of some stores, such as the shopping convenience, product 
information, pricing policy, and shipping and handling (436). Pan et al. used BizRate.com, which 
evaluates online retailers based on customer surveys, and reports daily prices and deal 
information for many retailers. They collected information on a number of electronic products 
like computer software, CDs, and DVDs. Their results show that retailer attributes have some 
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effect on price, especially the provision of product information and shipping and handling, but 
the effects are minimal, and a low adjusted R2, in the range of 5 percent to 22 percent, “suggests 
that the price dispersion among e-tailers can be explained by their differences in service quality 
only to a limited extent” (439). 
 Evidence from Pan et al. shows that online consumers have no more product information 
than Cosmo the classical consumer, and we can hypothesize that the simple Hotelling model 
described above would apply to the online Cosmo as well the offline Cosmo, with search time 
cost replacing travel time. Thus, we can consider a simple model of search costs. Shopper x has 
seen the price offered, p, at r stores, and store ri has the best offer of pi. Shopper x will thus 
continue searching, i.e. look at the price offered at an additional store if 
cx < J[pi, kx] 
         
+  +
 
where cx is the cost of an additional search to shopper x, kx is a measure of the shopper’s 
estimation of typical price of the product in question weighted by his information (more 
information means a more accurate estimate, less means his estimate is closer to pi), and J is the 
expected benefit of an additional search, or the likelihood and probable magnitude of finding a 
lower price offered than pi. The expected benefit, J, is a positively related function of pi, and an 
either negatively or positively related function of kx depending on whether shopper x knows 
typical prices are relatively low or high. During an exogenously high demand period, kx increases 
in absolute value. If it becomes more positive, shopper x knows he is unlikely to find a cheaper 
price, is less likely to conduct an additional search, and will most likely buy at price pi with an 
additional search or not. If kx becomes more negative, shopper x knows he is likely to find the 
product cheaper elsewhere, so he will most probably search again and end up buying at a cheaper 
price. Thus, exogenously high demand periods, by improving consumers’ knowledge, increase 
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the likelihood they will purchase at a lower price, and we have a result similar to that of the 
Hotelling model. One important difference to draw between the Hotelling model and the search 
model is the link between the demand increase and the price fall. In the Hotelling model above, a 
demand increase has a direct effect on willingness to travel for the lower price. In the search 
model, an increase in demand exogenously affects a consumer’s information about the market, 
which affects his willingness to continue searching given a current price option. Hence, the 
shoppers affected are those with a high price option and a high original expected market price—
those shoppers learn they can find the product elsewhere for a cheaper price, thus search more, 
and ultimately find and buy the product at the cheaper price. Hence, the important distinction is 
that for price to fall in the Hotelling model, a demand shock to only the good in question is 
needed, while a price fall in the search model requires a general demand shock. We can, of 
course, complicate the Hotelling model by adding price uncertainty and the necessity to expend 
search time for the lowest priced store, therefore making the two models more compatible. In 
this case, intuition would tell us that online search should be less of an impediment than 
searching brick-and-mortar stores, however, the results of Pan et al. say differently.  
 Do the search and Hotelling models apply to the case of eBay auctions? Searching 
through auctions works differently than searching for regularly sold items because when one 
finds an item he wants, he cannot click then-and-there and buy it. On eBay, auctions can span up 
to ten days before they close, so if Cosmo is searching for an item auctioned with great 
frequency, he will almost always find an auction in its early stages with a current highest bid 
below his reservation price and much lower than the high bid on many auctions in their end 
stages. However, low bids on young auctions may not be a winning strategy as you can easily be 
outbid. Furthermore, once a bidder is outbid, he has to bid again, incurring further time costs, 
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still without the promise of a return. Thus, search costs may actually be higher for eBay 
auctioned items than for regular retailed items.  
The dilemma shoppers face is also somewhat different. In this case, information about the 
market is based on not what typical prices are, but what people are typically willing to pay.  
Therefore, the more shopping and bidding one does on eBay, the more information he will have 
about ending auction prices, and what is the least he will likely need to pay to successfully win 
an auction. As in the search model above, when shoppers do not have as much information, they 
will have a wider distribution of prices they are willing to bid, will be more likely to bid on an 
auction rather than continue searching for lower high bid ones, and the final bids will tend to be 
more spread out. When demand is exogenously high and shopper information rises, the 
dispersion should fall and final bids should concentrate closer around the mean as consumers 
know the market better and will more likely search for lower high bid auctions than bid up an 
already pricy auction. Also, unlike in the original search model, since search costs and time costs 
of purchasing on eBay are higher by nature than at classical online stores, we can expect a 
shopper looking for a specific item on eBay to have greater information regarding the typical 
amount he will have to pay than would a shopper looking at classical online stores. For example, 
if Cosmo bids on one auction, and then is outbid, he will have to search and bid again, incurring 
more time costs and gaining more information. The additional time costs may not be worth it if 
Cosmo’s demand for the item is low, but a higher demand means he will likely continue trying to 
win the item and thereby gain more information. Thus, the case of eBay may actually be more 
similar to the Hotelling model in that an exogenous increase in the demand for a single item 
rather than demand in general can directly affect a shopper’s information and thus willingness to 
search and final auction prices. 
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4. The Data 
To test the elasticity theory and offer evidence for Tabarrok’s elasticity-based argument 
for why retailers do not raise the price on an item that is selling out, I use a hit toy from the 2009 
Christmas season as a case study. In October of 2009, there were two main lines of toys that 
were promising to be the hot toys of the coming Christmas shopping season. The first was 
BAKUGAN Battle Brawlers by Spin Master, a line of collectable mini Pokemon-esque, action-
figure monsters backed up by a trading card game and an anime TV series—a cool looking game 
appealing to pre-teen boys.  The second hot toy was the Zhu Zhu Pet Hamsters, made by a small 
American toy company, Cepia LLC. The Zhu Zhu Pets, also called Go Go Pets, are battery 
operated hamsters that scoot around on wheels and make hamster-like gurgling and squeaking 
noises. Though they do not have any trading card game or TV series to increase their appeal, 
they have accessories that Zhu Zhu Pet fans can salivate over, like the “Hamster Funhouse,” the 
“Hamster Bed and Blanket,” the “Hamster Car and Garage,” and even the “Hamster Surfboard!”  
There are five original Hamsters—Patches, Chunk, Pipsqueak, Mr. Squiggles, and Num Nums—
and four less popular hamsters which were released later in the holiday season— Jilly, Nugget, 
Scoodles, and Winkie. The original five Hamsters were selling off the shelves as early as 
October, and, along with Spin Masters’ BAKUGAN Battle Brawlers, were hailed in the media as 
the toy of the season. Despite my admittedly greater personal interest in the BAKUGAN figures 
and game, the data available online was not adequate for my purposes. There are dozens of 
different BAKUGAN figurines, and no individual one was offered on eBay in significant enough 
quantities to yield sufficient data. Furthermore, using as the population all the Battle Brawlers 
sold on eBay would not work, as any one figure differs on a number of style and game play 
elements leaving two different BAKUGAN, like “Alto Brontes” and “Alpha Percival,” 
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statistically not comparable without controlling for a vast swath of subjective variables. The Zhu 
Zhu Pets, on the other hand, with only five main hamsters, offered plenty of data and were, 
therefore, the toy of choice for the case study. To further narrow my data, I decided to follow just 
Pipsqueak, the yellowish hamster with a star on its back. 
 The sample period runs from October 28, 2009, to January 22, 2010, and it has two main 
components: completed auction data from eBay, and retail prices and in-stock/out-of-stock data 
from 14 online retailers. Worth noting: when the data collection began, the Zhu Zhu pets were 
already popular, as discussed above. Therefore, the data does not cover the entire pre-Christmas 
period of the demand shock the toys received due to their popularity, but instead starts 
somewhere in the middle. 
 Retailer Data: The 14 online retailers were found through a site called TheFind.com. 
Users search for a specific product and the site returns a list of online retailers selling that 
product. I used the site and determined 14 online retailers, unaffiliated with Amazon or eBay. 
Data on the price offered by each retailer and whether the toy was in or out of stock were 
collected once per day from November 6 to January 21. December 5 data is missing for all stores 
due to a collection error. The 14 stores included 3 large and 11 small retailers. The three large 
retailers are Toys “R” Us, Wall-Mart, and eToys. Toys “R” Us boasts the top spot as “the world's 
leading dedicated toy and baby products retailer” with over 1,550 store locations and a complete 
online store (“About” 1). Toys “R” Us currently owns FAO Schwartz, KB Toys, and eToys.com 
(“About” 2). Under the ownership of Toys “R” Us since February 2009, eToys.com is the second 
major retailer. eToys.com claims it is “[w]ell-known for offering a differentiated assortment of 
toys…[and] is a highly respected brand with a rich heritage of innovation and growth. The site 
was founded in 1997 as the first online toy retailer, and by 1998, eToys.com became the third 
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largest e-commerce site in the country” (“eToys” 1). Wal-Mart is the third major retailer for 
which data was retrieved—specifically Walmart.com.  “Founded in January 2000, Walmart.com 
is a subsidiary of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,” headquartered on the San Francisco Peninsula near 
Silicon Valley (“An Introduction”). The 11 smaller retailers are Kimmy Shop, Superhero Toys, 
Toy Wiz, Toy Store Inc, Cozcorp, Wall of Fame, Imperial Outpost Toys, Didgitech Toys, Virtual 
King, Discount Anime Toys, and Dragostand Bakugan. Kimmy Shop, Didgitech, and Wall of 
Fame claim to specialize in tough to find toys and merchandise. Superhero Toys sells mainly 
action figures and collectables. Discount Anime Toys and Cozcorp mostly sell collectable cards, 
especially Yu-Gi-Oh cards on Cozcorp, as well as other random toys and collectables. Toy Store 
Inc., Toy Wiz, and Imperial Outpost Toys all sell a general mix of toys and kids’ products. 
Virtual King has a smaller collection of toys, Zhu Zhu Pets and Pixar movie related toys being 
the most prevalent. Dragostand Bakugan sells nothing but Bakugan and more Bakugan and then 
a few Hamsters. 
 Collecting the data once each day left the possibility that Pipsqueak might come in stock 
and go back out of stock during the same day and never have been recorded as in stock. For the 
three major outlets, Wal-Mart, Toys R’ Us, and eToys, I was able to use a site called 
nowinstock.com, which sent me emails when the major stores had Pipsqueaks available online. 
 The eBay Data: The largest chunk of data was collected from the online auction site eBay 
where anyone can put up an item to sell, and anyone else can purchase it. There are three 
methods for selling items on eBay: The standard English auction where the bidder with the 
highest bid at the end of the scheduled auction time wins the item—sellers choose the starting 
price of the auction; the Buy it Now option, which offers an item at a certain price for a 
scheduled time period—a straight forward purchase; and the Best Offer option, where potential 
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buyers make offers above a minimum set by the seller until the seller accepts one of the offers or 
the scheduled time runs out. Conducting a search of completed listings on eBay gives the 
searcher all completed auction, Buy it Now, or Best Offer items over the past 15 days. Beginning 
November 12, data from a random sample of 100 completed listings was collected each week 
until January 21. The search would show up occasional results that were not just Pipsqueaks—
often Pipsqueak being sold with another item. All results that were not just Pipsqueak were 
removed from the sample, leaving slightly less than 100 random observations each week. The 
items were randomly selected using Microsoft Excel’s random number generator set to return 
random numbers between zero and one. Every Thursday night, a completed listings search for 
“Zhu Zhu Pets Hamsters Pipsqueak” was conducted. With 50 listings per page, the number of 
pages the search returned would be multiplied by Excel’s random number generator, giving some 
number between 0 and however many pages there were. 100 such random numbers were 
generated. Rounding the numbers to the nearest integer, I would then go to the corresponding 
search page and record the data from the top listing on the page. In the event Excel sent me to the 
same page twice, I simply took the data from the second listing on the page. Figure 2 shows the 
general layout of how completed listings appear on eBay.  
The data collected includes: Date, Final bid (if any), Starting bid (if not sold), Price (if it 
was a “Buy it Now” offer), starting price, number of bids, shipping price, estimated shipping 
time (if a range was specified, say 4 to 7 days, I recorded the midpoint, 5.5), percent positive 
feedback, and dummy variables for sold/not sold, top seller, and whether the method of sale was 
an auction, Buy it Now, or Best offer. N/A was recorded when the data was missing from the 
completed listing.  
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The seller’s percent of positive feedback is determined by the feedback received over the 
past 12 months on all transactions (that includes items the seller may have bought)—total 
positive feedback divided by total feedback. To be considered a “Top-rated seller,” the seller 
must have had at least 100 transactions and $3,000 in sales over the past 12 months, have a 
positive feedback of at least 98 percent, and go through the “PowerSeller program” which, 
according to eBay, requires a “proven track record of both quality and quantity” (“PowerSellers” 
and “Becoming”). 
The collection method worked very well through the weeks in November and December. 
Many Pipsqueaks were being offered on eBay, so the population I was drawing from was 
significantly large. However, in January, the number of Pipsqueaks offered dropped off 
precipitously, and the population became small enough for me to collect it in its entirety. 
Therefore, the random sample is truncated at approximately the New Year. I recorded weekly 
total completed listings from Saturday to the following Friday during the time period, and 
recorded any completed listings that popped up from the search that were not just Pipsqueaks. 
That gave me a gauge of how many Pipsqueaks were being offered on eBay per week. See 
Figure 3 for an approximate measure of supply. 
 
5. Descriptive Statistics 
Retailer Data 
Daily pricing data and in stock/out of stock data was collected from 14 online retailers 
over the time period of November 6, 2009, to January 21, 2010—giving 76 observations for each 
retailer. Table 1 displays the mean and standard deviation of the prices offered by the 14 retailers 
before Christmas, after Christmas, and over the entire period. Imperial Outpost Toys’ post-
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Christmas data is not available as the store never had Pipsqueaks in stock nor a price quote 
during the period.  
Only Kimmy Shop and Toy Store Inc. have a higher average price after Christmas (see 
Table 1). It is worth noting that Kimmy Shop maintained a price quote for the Pipsqueaks at 
$24.99 during the entire pre-Christmas period, but they did not get any in stock until after 
Christmas (See Figures 4 through 17 for comparative pricing, date, and in/out of stock data).  
This result of lower prices after Christmas is similar (though slightly more dramatic) to the 
results Warner and Barsky found as an average across their goods observed (Warner 329). Post-
Christmas data make for just 35.67% of the sample. Considering Figures 4 through 17, price 
changes were mostly non-existent among the three major retailers, with eToys making the only 
pricing change, while smaller retailers had a wider range of prices. 
Figures 4 through 17 show price changes over time for each store, as well as time series 
data for when the store had pipsqueaks in stock. Some stores maintained a quoted price even 
while they were out of stock, others had no price quote when they had no stock, which shows up 
as just empty space on the charts. The blue bars represent price charged that day, while red 
marks at the bottom show periods when Pipsqueaks were in stock. As mentioned in the previous 
section, data for all stores is missing on December 5 due to a collection error. The number and 
frequency of price changes varies dramatically depending on the store. Prices also do not seem to 
change during periods where a store is out of stock, which makes sense as a quoted price is not 
greatly meaningful when there is no stock to sell, and the retailer has no reason to be changing 
price. Since the three large outlets rarely had Pipsqueaks in stock, (Walmart was never recorded 
as having Pipsqueaks in stock), it could be argued that it is unsurprising that we see stagnant 
prices, since they have no stock to change their prices on. However, from the data taken from 
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nowinstock.com, we do know that over the course of the season, Toys “R” Us, Walmart.com, 
and eToys all had the toy in stock on an irregular basis, but, unlike the smaller stores, the stocks 
of the three large retailers would run out quickly—within one day—such that the in/out of stock 
data would be collected during times the Pipsqueaks were not in stock, and recorded as such, 
even though they may have been in stock earlier or later the same day. Thus, in Figures 4, 5, and 
6, for Toys “R” Us, Walmart, and eToys, respectively, dark blue marks at the bottom of each 
chart mark the days for which nowinstock.com alerted me that Pipsqueaks were in stock at that 
online retailer. This largely refutes the claim that we do not observe any price changes from Toys 
“R” Us or Walmart simply because they never had anything in stock in the first place. Also, as 
seen in Figures 7 through 17, price changes were much more frequent before Christmas and for 
the most part prices were higher. There are 111 total price changes across all stores, but only 13 
post-Christmas, so that while post-Christmas observations make up 35.5% of the data, only 
11.7% of the price changes happen during this period, and only one of those 13 price changes 
(Kimmy Shop) is a price increase.  
 eBay Data 
As mentioned, eBay completed listings data were collected from October 28, 2009, till 
January 20, 2010. Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of the eBay completed listings 
information on final price and full price (final price + shipping cost) over the course of the time 
series data for auctions and Buy it Now completed listings. Only 10 data points for Best Offer 
completed listings were collected using the random data collection method described earlier over 
the entire collection period. Therefore, the Best Offer option will be dropped from the sample. 
Moreover, there were only six completed listings of sold items of Buy it Now offers after 
Christmas, so Buy it Now data is excluded from Table 2. Figure 18 is a chart of the average price 
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of Pipsqueaks from the beginning of the collection period until Christmas, and displays a clear 
price trend—final auction prices rising through much of November, and flattening off towards 
the end of November and very beginning of December, then declining rapidly until Christmas. 
This trend line is reflected in a good portion of the retailer charts of price over time. 
The average price of all completed auctions is $25.28, and the average full price is 
$30.35. These are each $1 lower than the same statistics for just the pre-Christmas sample 
because of the way the data is heavily weighted on the pre-Christmas side. As mentioned earlier, 
after Christmas, and especially moving into January, the number of Pipsqueaks offered for sale 
on eBay dropped off precipitously, and very few of those offered were purchased. Thus, the 
useful data falls off after Christmas, and, as Table 2 shows, there are only 39 observations of sold 
auctions in the post-Christmas data. Nevertheless, the post-Christmas prices are clearly and 
dramatically lower than pre-Christmas prices—average final price is $12.67 less after Christmas, 
a 48.5% price drop, and average full price is $12.99 less after Christmas, a 41.6% price drop. So 
we find here evidence that the pre-Christmas period may be a peak demand period compared to 
the post-Christmas period, both in more purchases and in higher final auction prices—people are 
clearly willing to pay more for a Pipsqueak before Christmas than after. 
Pre- and post-Christmas average Buy it Now Price and Full Price are comparable to the 
average auction prices, showing up only slightly greater. 
 
6. Determining the Peak Demand Period 
To test the elasticity theory, we want to see if price dispersion is less in peak periods than 
in non- or lesser peak demand periods. However, the first step in making any comparisons 
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between peak periods and non-peak or lesser peak periods is to establish just what those periods 
are. 
Weekends 
One preliminary step would be to copy Warner and Barsky, and consider weekends as 
mini-peaks, however, their data was collected from brick and mortar stores, while mine was from 
online retailers and eBay, which calls for perhaps a slight erratum to the assumption that 
weekends represent small demand peaks. Warner and Barsky assume that the theory holds, then 
look at retailers’ weekday vs. weekend price changes to determine if the theoretically higher 
demand on weekends results in an increase in price cuts. They find a significant negative 
weekend effect on price level, if small in absolute magnitude, displaying some evidence that 
retailers face a more elastic demand curve on weekends. If we accept the assumption that 
weekends represent mini-peak demand periods, Warner and Barsky’s results support the 
elasticity theory that argues consumers will be more price sensitive during high demand periods. 
I question, however, the applicability of treating weekends as higher demand periods when in the 
context of online retail.  Online retailers are accessible at all hours of the day and night, meaning 
shoppers can return home from work and leisurely buy products online from the comfort of their 
living room couch. Shopping at brick and mortar outlets requires a greater investment of time, 
which consumers may not be willing to suffer after returning home from work on a weekday. 
Furthermore, not all brick and mortar stores are open at night and shopping at them may not be 
an option for some people during the week. Finally, online shopping can be accomplished at 
work for many people, further breaking down the weekday shopping barrier. Therefore, online 
retailers may not see a small spike in demand during weekends.  
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Consider eBay first. Weekday data includes all data taken on Mondays, Tuesdays, 
Wednesdays and Thursdays. Weekend data includes Fridays, Saturdays, and Sundays. Buy it 
Now items have slightly higher prices on weekends; average full price is $4.09 (12.4 percent) 
higher, and the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by mean) is 3 percent lower—
weakly supportive of the elasticity theory that price dispersion will fall during peak demand 
periods as consumers are more price sensitive (see Table 3). The auction data is somewhat 
different since buyers bid up the price rather than accept or reject a price offered by the seller. 
Nevertheless, if weekends represent mini-peak demand periods, the analysis should be the 
same—bidders should bid up the prices more on weekends, ceteris paribus, (since the end of the 
auction is when the greatest percent of the bidding happens), and the elasticity theory implies 
lower price dispersion (Ockenfels 3). The data however show the opposite; average full price 
falls by 2.35045 (7.5%) on weekends, and the coefficient of variation falls 16.06%.  Again, these 
weekend results are not entirely shocking for the same reasons discussed above—we are looking 
at online sales, meaning consumers do not face the same time and convenience constraints faced 
when shopping at brick and mortar stores. The case could be made, however, that average final 
prices could fall on weekends despite a higher demand because the supply of Pipsqueaks offered 
increases. Steiner (2004), surveying almost 1000 eBay sellers, found evidence that weekends, 
specifically Sundays, are the most popular time to end an auction—57.5 percent of respondents 
said Sunday was the optimal ending time. Unfortunately, total daily number of completed 
listings for Pipsqueaks was not collected, so I am unable to do a quantitative analysis of weekend 
Pipsqueak supply. 
We can also use regression analysis as an additional test of the importance of weekends 
on final auction prices on eBay. I regressed full price of all completed auction listings on dummy 
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variables for each day of the week—the EViews results are presented in Figure 19, and Figure 20 
shows the difference between the estimated coefficient for each day of the week and the average 
full price of the sample. To avoid perfect multicollinearity the constant term was dropped from 
the equation. All coefficients are significant at the 1% level. Again for Friday, Saturday, and 
Sunday we observe lower final full prices for completed auctions than we do for weekday 
completed auctions. 
My data on the 14 online retailers is relatively similar to Warner and Barsky’s, and I am 
able to make similar tests as they of the price-effect of weekends. Table 4 displays weekend vs. 
weekday data over the entire sample period for each online retailer and the combined total. The 
total shows that weekend prices are slightly lower than weekday prices. Weekday average price 
across all 14 retailers is $29.41, while weekend average price is $28.81. This is consistent with 
Warner and Barsky’s results (pages 335, 341, and 342), and though the difference in my 
aggregate results is slightly smaller, Warner and Barsky also found the magnitude of weekend 
markdowns to be economically small. 
If the major retailers (Toys “R” Us and Walmart, who rarely had Pipsqueaks in stock and 
showed no price changes, and eToys, who had only one price change) are removed, as well as 
Kimmy Shop and Imperial Outpost Toys, who both had less than three price changes and had the 
toy in stock for less than a third of the data collection period, the weekend average price becomes 
$34.40, and weekday average price is $34.92—the difference in not statistically significant at the 
10 percent level of significance. In this case, the margin shrinks to being economically 
insignificant, and it is difficult, based on these results to claim that online retailers see a different 
demand curve on weekends. This ultimately disagrees with Warner and Barsky’s conclusion that 
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weekend demand is more elastic and retailers offer more competitive prices as a consequence. 
However, for all the reasons above described, this result I do not find surprising.  
We can also look at the retailers’ price changes by day of the week. Figure 21 displays 
the cumulative price change occurring each day of the week over the entire period. Interestingly, 
this data displays much more evidence for the theory that sellers face a different demand curve 
on weekends and drop price accordingly on the weekend. Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays 
display a general increase in prices, while Thursdays, the day before the weekend, show a 
significant decrease in prices. Fridays and Sundays also display a decrease in price, though price 
changes on Saturdays generally seem to be price increases. This is more supportive of Warner 
and Barsky’s results, though certainly not robust evidence. We can also conduct a similar 
analysis by considering price regressed on dummies for each day of the week—a nearly identical 
procedure to that done by Warner and Barsky (Figure 22 shows the EViews regression results). 
Again the constant term was dropped to avoid perfect multicollinearity. Figure 23 shows the 
difference between the coefficient for each day of the week and the average price across the 
entire season. Toys “R” Us, eToys, Walmart.com, Kimmy Shop, and Imperial Outpost Toys 
were eliminated from the sample for reasons discussed above. The result is very similar to that of 
Warner and Barsky—a higher price on weekdays, with price dropping on Thursday through 
Saturday, and beginning to rise again Sunday. If we accept the mini-peak weekend demand 
theory, we could infer that retailers are reacting to a higher elasticity by cutting prices on 
weekends. 
Unfortunately, after siphoning through several theories and contradictory and/or 
inconclusive evidence in the eBay data, it cannot be said with any level of confidence that the 
mini-peak demand on weekends theory holds for eBay auctions, and therefore, any weekend vs. 
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weekday price dispersion tests of the eBay data are of little use in analyzing the hot-toy problem. 
This leaves a potentially interesting result found in the retailer data somewhat useless. 
Pre-Christmas vs. Post-Christmas 
An easy step would be to just look at pre- vs. post-Christmas data. However, only 39 
observations were collected after Christmas, and for all data points collected after January 7, 
there were fewer than 100 hits based on my completed listing search and I was able to collect the 
entire population. Nearly all items that showed up in this period were not just Pipsqueak 
listings—instead usually a Pipsqueak and another hamster or two, like a Chunk and a Mr. 
Squiggles being sold together as one—and had to be eliminated from the sample. After January 
7, my search found only six singular Pipsqueaks offered, and only two were sold, at prices of 
$7.99 and $10.55. Hence, we cannot learn much about post-Christmas demand movements other 
than that demand falls off precipitously. Therefore, simple pre- vs. post-Christmas analysis will 
not be useful, so high pre-Christmas vs. low pre-Christmas estimated demand will need to be the 
contrasted time periods. 
Higher Peak Demand vs. Lower Peak Demand 
 Warner and Barsky used the days between Thanksgiving and Christmas as their 
comparative high demand period. Chevalier et al. studied supermarket purchases, and arbitrarily 
chose the three week period from the week before Christmas to the week after to include for pre-
New Years shopping demand. For my data however, we could expect the highest part of the peak 
demand period to drop off a bit over a week before Christmas because of necessary shipping 
time. Perhaps the most compelling argument for Pipsqueak eBay demand movements would 
contend that equilibrium demand over time should be a concave polynomial maximizing a week 
or two before Christmas. This would make sense as a Pipsqueak is worth more if bought before 
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Christmas and can be given as a gift on Christmas day. We can also imagine a possible bump 
along the trend line for Hanukkah. If we use eBay final auction prices as an estimator for 
movements in willingness to pay, and use that to infer general movements in the demand curve 
over the season, Figure 18 offers some interesting insights. It displays, as expected, a concave 
pre-Christmas full price trend. However, the peak appears to be sometime in late November—
much earlier than expected given shipping speeds average 5.5 days over all observations and 
only 18 of the 609 observations have estimated shipping time of over 10 days. Thus, shipping 
speed alone offers little reasoning for why the estimated demand appears to drop off so early. 
Even Hanukkah is too distant (begun on December 11) for shipping time to play a major role in 
the early drop off in willingness to pay, though one could argue it plays a part in the continued 
fall in price. 
Possibly the most convincing argument for the early drop off in price is a supply based 
argument—that an increase in the number of Pipsqueaks being offered for auction drove prices 
down. As mentioned earlier, the total number of completed listings results found by my weekly 
search was recorded. From each weekly random sample, the percent of observations that were 
usable (i.e. just a Pipsqueak, not a Pipsqueak and a Chunk for example) can be multiplied by the 
total number of results found for that week to give an estimate of the total number of Pipsqueak 
auctions completed each week on eBay, in other words, the supply. So for example, if an eBay 
completed auction search for Pipsqueaks were to return 5,000 hits completed in the past week, 
and of a random sample of 100 items from that week, 90 were usable observations (just 
Pipsqueak), then the projected supply of just Pipsqueak items that week would be 4,500. Figure 2 
compares the week by week average full price over the season with week by week supply. 
Indeed, we find strong negative supply/price movement during the late November period—
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supply shoots up 359 percent to over 6000, while average full price begins to fall after five 
weeks of rising. Price continues to fall until finally flattening out around the same time that 
supply crashes back down. However, other than the two large supply movements separated by 
three weeks, price seems to move entirely unrelated to supply. In fact, the estimated weekly 
supply appears to mimic the weekly average price, but about two weeks behind, and since less 
than 20 percent of eBay auctions last longer than seven days, this suggests that price is 
influencing supply more than vice versa (Chou  4). Moreover, if we look at the prices of the nine 
retailers who had more than one price change over the sample period (Figures 9 through 17), we 
find a similar trend as the eBay data, with prices rising and falling around similar dates. These 
retailers are unaffiliated with eBay, and a change in the number of Pipsqueaks offered on eBay 
should not have a strong influence on their pricing decisions. Therefore, seeing a similar pattern 
in both the retailers and on eBay implies that there is an exogenous increase in demand during 
mid to late November. While there appears to be some supply influence on final auction prices, it 
certainly is not telling the whole story. Nevertheless, it could be part of the reason why final 
auction prices appear to fall before expected. There are several other possible explanations for 
the early drop in willingness to pay: (1) shoppers spent more time at brick and mortar stores 
thanks to post Thanksgiving sales, and thus eBay auctions got less attention; (2) the toy simply 
became less desired; (3) the false rumor that the Zhu Zhu Pets contained unsafe levels of 
antimony, which hit CBS news first on December 5, may have given a second wind to an 
otherwise slight price drop (“Zhu Zhu Hamsters May Pose”). 
We can also consider the week by week percent of auctions sold, or equivalently the 
percent of auction items that received at least one bid, to determine the period in which shoppers 
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are the most vigorous searchers. Figure 24 displays the weekly percent of sold auctions over the 
period. We find again a similar peak period, though somewhat wider in both directions. 
One final measurement we can use to identify the highest demand period is the number of 
bids per auction. Figure 25 shows the trend in number of bids per auction over the season. Once 
more we see the usual shape, though less pronounced, and it is not very clear where exactly the 
high period begins to tail off.  
Also, to help determine specific starting and ending days of the peak demand period, I 
determined day by day average full price (Figure 26). From this graph we can see that on 
November 12, average full price jumps above $35, where it remains without any significant up 
or down trend until December 2 when if falls back down below $35. On either end of this section 
there is a clear up/down trend. Moreover, from the previous evidence, the supply argument is the 
only one that does in fact dispute this period as the highest period of the pre-Christmas peak 
demand period. Furthermore, while an increase in supply during the seven day period of 
November 28 to December 4 may have some causal relationship with the subsequent drop in 
final auction price, it is unclear its extent and where exactly that effect begins, and we cannot, 
therefore, say a fall in willingness to pay is not in fact the reason for the drop in price. It is, thus, 
not unreasonable to say that the population of bidders during this period, November 12 to 
December 2, is that which appears to have the highest demand for Pipsqueaks. Perhaps during 
this period consumer information has reached its apex—enough children have seen and know 
about the toy that they are begging their parents for one—or perhaps parents are willing to pay a 
premium during this period because they are worried they will not be able to get a hamster later, 
or that prices will keep rising even higher. Hence, I propose the period of November 12 to 
December 2 as the highest peak demand period, which can then be compared to all other periods. 
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To test if the average full price during the chosen period is significantly greater than the 
average of all other times, a simple t-test can be used. The null and alternative hypothesis are 
 H0 :  m1 = m2 
 HA :  m1 > m2 
Where m1 is the mean of the full price of all observations sampled between November 12 and 
December 2, and m2 is the mean of all other observations. We find, m1 = $38.8 and there are 231 
observations in the sample, and m2 is $25.79 with 363 observations. The difference in means is 
13.01 and the estimate of the standard error is approximately 0.5, thus giving a t-score of 26.02, 
which, with 592 degrees of freedom, shows that m1 is greater than m2 at the at the 1% level of 
significance. This supports the use of November 12 to December 2 as the period of highest 
demand. 
 We can use the number of bids per auction as an additional test of consumer activity 
during my proposed peak demand period. The search model predicts that price dispersion will 
decrease during peak demand periods because that is when consumer knowledge is greatest due 
to increased searching and bidding. Consider the following OLS estimation, 
NBi = β0 + β1Di + β2FSPi + ϵi 
where NBi is the number of bids on auction i, β0 is a constant, Di is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the auction was completed between November 12 and December 2 inclusive, and zero 
otherwise, FSPi is the full starting price (starting price plus shipping cost), and ϵi is a standard 
stochastic error term. The null and alternative hypotheses are 
H0 :  β1 = 0    H0 :  β2 = 0 
HA :  β1 > 0    H0 :  β2 < 0. 
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We expect β1 to be positive because higher demand should result in increased bidding, and β2 to 
be negative because the higher the beginning bid, fewer additional bids should be placed before 
the high bid reaches consumers’ willingness to pay. The EViews output is reported in Figure 27. 
The results are 
NBi = 14.44241   +   4.31007Di   –   0.39689FSPi 
            (0.38355) (0.42598)         (0.02512) 
       t = 37.65703   10.12718        -15.79763  
   Adjusted R2 = 0.347209            n = 576. 
 The coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level in the predicted direction, so 
we can reject the null hypothesis in both cases, and find evidence that holding staring cost 
constant, the number of bids per auction increase during the projected peak demand period, 
implying bidders are in fact more active and therefore more informed. (An additional regression 
was run including an interaction term of Di*FSPi. The term was insignificant and the coefficients 
and Adjusted R2 changed minimally). This further supports the use of November 12 to December 
2 as the highest demand period. However, this result should be not be given too much weight. 
The number of bids is a somewhat flawed tool of measurement since, even holding starting price 
constant, it is largely based on how high bidders bid above the previous bid. Also it is likely 
influenced by eBay’s bidder reserve mechanism, where a bidder can specify the maximum they 
are willing to bid, and if his or her current bid is out-bid, eBay will bid automatically place a new 
bid at one dollar higher, continuing this up until the specified reserve. Therefore, much of the 
observed increase in bidding activity may actually not be related to additional bidder activity and 
subsequent gains in bidder information.   
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7. Coefficient of Variation as a Test of the Elasticity Theory 
As discussed earlier, the main method we are able to use to estimate changes in elasticity 
is through changes in the dispersion or variance of final auction prices. A flatter demand curve 
means consumers are more sensitive to price, and will search more for the lowest priced item. 
With increased searching, we would expect fewer auctions with a small high bid to go unnoticed, 
and thus they are bid up closer to the average. We would also expect to see fewer expensive high 
bid Pipsqueaks to receive additional bids, as more consumers instead search for and bid on lower 
high bid auctions. Therefore, we would expect the dispersion of final auction prices to decline, 
and the standard deviation to shrink during the period of November 12 to December 2. On the 
other hand, if the elasticity theory is untrue or does not apply in the case of online purchases, we 
would expect no change to the price dispersion over the entire sample period. As a preliminary 
step, a simple F-test can be used on the standard deviation of the two different data periods. The 
hypothesis are 
H0 :  S1 = S2 
 HA :  S1 < S2, 
where S1 is the standard deviation of full price for all completed auctions in the estimated highest 
demand period, and S2 is the standard deviation for all other completed auctions. The test statistic 
in this case is just S22/S12.  From the data we find S22 = 50.84 and S22 = 25.57, so F = 1.99. This is 
greater than the critical value for the 1 percent level of significance, so we can reject the null 
hypothesis that the standard deviation is not less during the estimated peak demand period. 
However, there is good reason for this result to be questioned. First, the estimated peak demand 
period was chosen because it is where full price appears to reach it apex, while the before 
November 12 and after December 2 full price follows a clear up and down trend, demand 
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appearing to increase or decrease over time (consider figure 26). If the true mean of the full price 
is in fact inconstant over time, then variation around the mean of the entire sample is not entirely 
random. Thus, holding random variance around the true mean constant, we would expect a larger 
variance around the sample mean than we would if the true mean was constant. Second, if the 
sample mean is unreflective of the true mean, then the overall sample standard deviation tells us 
nothing in-and-of-itself about the price dispersion or consumer price sensitivity.  
To fix this problem, we can break the sample down into day-by-day means and standard 
deviations to account for fluctuations in the true mean, and then run a simple regression using the 
per day coefficient of variation (standard deviation of day i divided by mean of day i) as the 
dependant variable. The estimated OLS regression is 
SDt/Avgt = a0 + a1Dt + ϵt, 
where SDt/Avgt is the day-by-day coefficient of variation, a0 is a constant, Dt is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the date was between November 12 and December 2 inclusive, and zero 
otherwise, and ϵt is a standard stochastic error term. The null and alternative hypotheses are 
 H0 :  a1 = 0 
 HA :  a1 < 0. 
I chose to use the coefficient of variation, a customary measure of price dispersion (Sorensen 
[2000], Carlson and Pescatrice [1980]), instead of standard deviation because we are interested 
in the degree of price variance in each period regardless of differences in the mean—we want to 
know the relative difference in price dispersion between the higher and lower demand periods 
rather than the absolute difference (Baye 467). For example, a standard deviation of 5 around a 
mean of 40 implies much more relative price sensitivity than a standard deviation of 5 around a 
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mean of 10. All days with fewer than four observations were removed from the sample. I used 
EViews to estimate the equation. The EViews results are reported in Figure 28. The results are 
                                SDt/Avgt = 0.147647      –      0.035742Dt 
                   (0.012522) (0.020264) 
               t = 11.79141   -1.763809 
           Adjusted R2 = 0.037622              n = 55. 
The coefficient a1 has the expected negative sign, and with 54 degrees of freedom, the critical 
value for a one sided t-test at the 5 percent level of significance is 1.673565. Since the absolute 
value of the t-statistic for Dt is 1.763809, which is greater than 1.674689, we can reject the null 
hypothesis at the 5 percent level of significance. Moreover, the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient of Dt is quite substantial. The mean of all of the observations of SDt/Avgt is 
0.136226, and the estimated a1 is 0.035742. Thus, we find that the estimated coefficient of Dt is 
26.24 percent of the mean of SDt/Avgt —implying that there is a 26.24 percent decrease in the 
price dispersion when in the highest region of the peak demand period compared to the sample as 
a whole. The fit of the equation is quite small, but that is not particularly surprising given the 
imprecise nature of how the most-peak demand period was determined. Nevertheless, if the 
estimated highest peak demand period is reasonably correct, we find fairly sound evidence that 
price dispersion does in fact decrease during this highest demand period relative to the other 
periods, implying that when consumers’ demand for Pipsqueaks increases, their price sensitivity 
and willingness to search increases as well. Thus, we find support for the elasticity theory as well 
as Tabarrok’s elasticity argument for why retailers and manufacturers may have less of a profit 
incentive for raising price than a first glance observation may lead one to believe.  
 One potential problem with the regression results is the presence of serial correlation. The 
Durbin-Watson d-statistic for the estimated regression is 1.42 and the lower critical d-value at 50 
degrees of freedom is 1.5 (Studenmond 617). Thus, there may be moderate serial correlation in 
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the residuals, which could mean the estimates of the standard errors are negatively biased, 
increasing the likelihood of a type-1 error. To correct for the potential bias, the equation can be 
re-estimated using the AR(1) Generalized Least Squares method. The results of the GLS estimate 
are  
                                SDt/Avgt = 0.154422      –      0.042175Dt 
                   (0.014376) (0.022081) 
               t = 10.74150   -1.910011 
           Adjusted R2 = 0.039632             n = 51. 
(EViews results are listed in Figure 29). The results of the original estimated equation appear to 
be robust in the face of potential serial correlation. The coefficients and the standard errors of the 
of the GLS estimate increase slightly over those of the original estimate, and the t-statistic for a1 
increases, so the null hypothesis can still be rejected at the 5 percent level of significance. 
 Though day-by-day pre- and post-Christmas standard deviations in the full price cannot 
be measured due to a lack of data in the post-Christmas period, we can compare the periods as 
whole blocks, or do a week by week analysis. Table 2 shows that there is actually a decrease in 
the standard deviation in the post-Christmas data, dropping from 8.89 to 7.04, which is the 
opposite of what we would expect. However, if the coefficient of variation is considered instead, 
we find the post-Christmas price dispersion to be much higher than that of pre-Christmas, 
increasing from 0.2847 to 0.3829—what we would expect under the elasticity theory. Moreover, 
if we consider week by week averages of the full price we find an even more visually striking 
result. Consider Figure 30, and Table 5 (weeks are considered Monday-Sunday). In all weeks, 
except October 28 to November 1 (a partial week because data was not collected before October 
28), and the week of December 21 to December 27, the two weeks with the fewest observations, 
we see that the coefficient of variation moves noticeably opposite to the average full price. 
Moreover, in the week after Christmas, when not only our estimated highest peak period is over, 
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but the entire peak demand Christmas shopping season has ended, there is a dramatic jump in 
price dispersion. It would be helpful to see if this higher dispersion remains the trend in 
subsequent weeks after Christmas, but unfortunately the available data disappears. Nevertheless, 
this offers additional evidence supporting the elasticity theory. 
If we disregard the evidence against the mini-peak weekend demand hypothesis, and 
assume it is true, we can use the same regression method to test changes in relative standard 
deviation on weekends vs. weekdays. The estimated OLS regression is 
SDt/Avgt = a0 – a1DWt + ϵt, 
where SDt/Avgt, a0, and ϵt are the same as before, and DWt is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the observation is from a Friday, Saturday or Sunday, and zero otherwise. The null and 
alternative hypothesis are the same as before, as are the sample restrictions. The OLS regression 
estimate is 
                                SDt/Avgt = 0.130000      –      0.008800DWt 
                   (0.013692) (0.020308) 
               t = 9.494829     0.433326 
          Adjusted R2 = -0.015271              n = 55. 
(EViews results presented in Figure 31). Unsurprisingly, since the theory was weak, the results 
are poor with a1 having the wrong sign and a statistically insignificant t-score. The null 
hypothesis can, therefore, not be rejected and the previous conclusion that the weekends do not 
represent mini-demand peaks in the eBay market for Pipsqueaks is further supported. This is 
unfortunate because we found some evidence, though admittedly not strong evidence, that the 14 
retailers cut price more often and in greater magnitude on weekends, (consider Figures 21 and 
23). If eBay supplied evidence that demand rose on weekends, we could interpret the retailers 
price movements as evidence that they were responding to greater elasticity of demand on 
weekends potentially due to the higher demand. However, the eBay data gives no reason to 
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believe that weekends actually act as small-peak demand periods nor that shoppers are more 
price sensitive on weekends. Hence, we can learn little of use from the retailers’ day-by-day 
price changes. 
Supply as a Potential Counterpoint 
The issue of supply is a potential counter point to the significance of my results. Baye, 
Morgan, and Scholten (2004) tested to see if the number of sellers offering a particular item 
influences the price dispersion of that item. They used a popular price comparison site called 
Shopper.com and looked at the prices of the top 1,000 products over an eight month span. They 
found that “the number of firms listing prices for these products varies a great deal—both cross 
sectionally and over time” (Baye 464). Moreover, “the level of price dispersion is greater when 
small numbers of firms list prices than when large numbers do” (465). Therefore, if we were to 
see a greater number of Pipsqueak auctions being completed during the estimated peak demand 
period, then, given evidence from Baye et al., one could make the case that the negative 
coefficient of Dt is due to greater supply rather than higher demand. However, consider once 
more Figure 3; there are three distinct weeks, from November 28 to December 18, where the 
number of completed Pipsqueak auctions is greater than 6,400, while all other weeks the same 
statistic is less than 2,700—a clear break. Moreover, while this 21 day high supply period 
overlaps the highest and less-high demand periods, 16 of the 21 days fall in the less-high demand 
period. Hence, if supply is playing a role in price dispersion, then it should actually work to 
decrease price dispersion more in the less-high demand periods than in the high demand period! 
Evidence from Baye et al., therefore, increases the significance of my results; even with supply-
induced downward pressure on price dispersion during the less-high demand period, price 
dispersion is still statistically significantly less during the highest demand period! Additionally, 
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since the conventional definition of price dispersion that Baye et al. use is not the same as mine, 
it is not necessarily clear that their results should cross over to my data or vice versa. They 
consider the dispersion of prices offered by firms irrespective of what consumers buy, and their 
“supply” is the number of firms listing prices. I consider the dispersion of prices at which 
individual items are bought, and my “supply” is the number of completed auctions. Therefore, 
price dispersion in my data is primarily a product of consumer behavior, while price dispersion 
in their data is determined more so by suppliers, and comparing results across the two data sets 
may be erroneous. 
  
8. Conclusion 
Theories have been suggested for why retailers and/or manufacturers do not raise the 
price of a sellout hot-toy to the market clearing level. Other than DeGraba’s theory of contrived 
shortages, the plausibility of all these theories rests heavily on the opportunity cost of not raising 
price—how much profit are manufacturers and retailers forgoing by maintaining a shortage? The 
greater the benefit of raising price and capturing a larger margin, the more likely that benefit 
outweighs the theorized costs or benefits of doing or not doing so. Tabarrok argues that the 
larger the shortage, the more elastic the demand curve and the less additional profit a price 
increase would create. Similarly, the elasticity theory vies that as demand rises for a specific 
good or in general, consumers become more elastic and therefore sellers tend to offer sales more 
often—or in the hot-toy case, not increase price. My analysis supports Tabarrok’s argument and 
the elasticity theory. Using the eBay data, I was able to determine an estimated highest demand 
period within the pre-Christmas data. A variance test showed a statistically significant decrease 
in the coefficient of variation of full price when in the highest demand period, and a simple OLS 
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regression of the day-by-day coefficient of variation on a dummy variable for days within the 
highest demand period gave a negative coefficient of 0.035742, significant at the 5 percent level. 
The magnitude of the decrease in the coefficient of variation during the highest peak demand 
period was equivalent to 26.24 percent of the mean of the dependant variable. Moreover, despite 
limited post-Christmas data, what is usable shows a clear increase in the coefficient of variation 
after Christmas. Using movements in the price dispersion as an estimator for directional 
movements in the price elasticity, my results supply evidence that the highest demand period is 
coupled with greater elasticity. Ultimately, I find support for Tabarrok’s argument that increasing 
the price of a sell-out toy may result in only small short-term profit gains.  
Several worthy objections can be made against my somewhat irregular method of testing 
the elasticity theory as evidence for or against Tabarrok’s theory. First, one can argue that the 
elasticity theory, like the tacit collusion and loss-leader theories, is not applicable in peak 
demand cases involving shortages. One line of the elasticity theory reasoning says that 
consumers are more elastic during peak periods because if one store raises price they can go to 
another store and buy it for a cheaper price, but this does not work if there are shortages. Price 
differences at stores are irrelevant if both are out of stock. The advantage of my method is that I 
use the secondary market, eBay, to be able to estimate the direction of movements in demand 
and elasticity beyond the point of the shortage. I cannot measure elasticity at the current 
shortage-inducing price, but that was not my goal. Instead I seek to identify the direction of 
movements in elasticity given the direction of movements in demand. Likewise, objections can 
be raised about using eBay completed auction prices as an estimator of demand, and the standard 
deviation and coefficient of variation as estimators of elasticity. However, again, my objective is 
not to measure the magnitude of the demand or elasticity, but merely their co-movement and 
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whether or not there appears to be a negative relationship. While an increase in the average final 
auction price of the Pipsqueaks does not inform us of the extent to which demand changed, it 
does imply that more people are bidding and higher bids are being placed on the same items—
suggesting demand has increased.  
A useful extension of this work would be to consider prices offered on other secondary 
market sites like Amazon and Craigslist, or to look at co-movements of a hot item and its 
complements, such as a game console and the games that go with it, or Pipsqueak and the 
Hamster Fun House. Also, it may be interesting to compare holiday season demand and price 
dispersion movements of a hot toy with those of a non-hot toy, but finding a non-hot toy with 
enough auction offers on eBay may be difficult. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1  
Taken from Tabarrok’s “Hot-Toy Problem, page 514. 
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Figure 2 
Format of Competed Listings as Displayed on the eBay Website 
 
 
Figure 3 
Weekly Average Full Price and Number of Completed Listings  
 
 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
10/28/2009 11/12/2009 11/27/2009 12/12/2009 12/27/2009
—
Full Price (left 
axis)
---
Approximate
number of 
completed 
listings (right 
axsis)
 Clair 47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE I 
Total, Pre, and Post-Christmas Means and Standard Deviations for all 14 Online Retailers 
 Total Pre-Christmas Post-Christmas 
Toys “R” Us Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
9.990000 
0.000000 
 
9.990000 
0.000000 
 
9.990000 
0.000000 
 
Walmart Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
8.000000 
0.000000 
 
8.000000 
0.000000 
 
8.000000 
0.000000 
 
eToys Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
11.69732 
3.809488 
 
15.37462 
5.188745 
 
9.990000 
0.000000 
 
Kimmy Shop Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
26.15883 
4.464487 
 
24.99000 
0.000000 
 
28.32333 
7.125253 
 
Digitech Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
43.62461 
16.64433 
 
52.15563 
15.50261 
 
29.00000 
0.000000 
 
Dragostand-Bakugan Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
29.12526 
8.868978 
 
33.49917 
7.911047 
 
21.51074 
4.184151 
 
Superhero Toys Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
31.13474 
10.55740 
 
36.65667 
9.135699 
 
21.47148 
4.089107 
 
Wall of Fame Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
39.96183 
14.27583 
 
44.71093 
13.82945 
 
32.21222 
11.79418 
 
Virtual King Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
37.62158 
13.20287 
 
42.69833 
14.29024 
 
28.87889 
2.118296 
 
Cozcorp Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
23.77961 
10.11902 
 
29.51354 
8.500386 
 
13.95000 
0.000000 
 
Toy Store Inc. Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
29.34474 
11.65902 
 
35.15583 
11.09790 
 
35.49000 
10.66677 
 
Toy Wiz Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
31.46890 
12.95802 
 
39.32244 
10.38350 
 
18.73074 
1.953155 
 
Discount Anime Toys Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
46.46684 
10.19761 
 
50.89333 
10.13599 
 
38.83889 
4.003204 
 
Imperial Outpost Toys Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
24.37095 
5.920103 
 
24.37095 
5.920103 
 
n/a 
Total Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
29.15503 
15.48063 
 
33.84837 
16.35790 
 
21.55821 
10.12353 
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Figure 4 
Toys R Us 
 
—  Price 
—  In Stock 
—  Nowitstock alert 
 
Figure 5 
Walmart 
 
—  Price 
—  In Stock 
—  Nowitstock alert 
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Figure 6 
eToys 
 
—  Price 
—  In Stock 
—  Nowitstock alert 
 
Figure 7 
Kimmy Shop 
 
—  Price 
—  In Stock 
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Figure 9 
Digitech 
 
—  Price 
—  In Stock 
Figure 8 
Imperial Outpost Toys 
 
—  Price 
—  In Stock 
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Figure 10 
Dragostand Bakugan 
 
—  Price 
—  In Stock 
 
Figure 11 
Superhero Toys 
 
—  Price 
—  In Stock 
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Figure 12 
Wall of Fame 
 
—  Price 
—  In Stock 
 
Figure 13 
Virtual King 
 
—  Price 
—  In Stock 
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Figure 14 
Cozcorp 
 
—  Price 
—  In Stock 
 
Figure 15 
Toy Store Inc 
 
—  Price 
—  In Stock 
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Figure 16 
Toy Wiz 
 
—  Price 
—  In Stock 
 
Figure 17 
Discount Anime 
 
—  Price 
—  In Stock 
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TABLE II 
eBay, Total, Pre, and Post-Christmas Cumulative Statistics  
 Total Pre-Christmas Post-Christmas 
Final Price 
(Auctions) 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N.o.bs 
25.32985 
 9.093804 
594 
 
26.13453 
 8.685723 
556 
 
13.64278 
 6.608313 
36 
 
Final Full Price 
(Auctions) 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N.o.bs 
30.39039 
 9.323743 
594 
 
31.21919 
 8.888276 
556 
 
18.39333 
 7.042434 
36 
 
Price 
(Buy it Now) 
 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N.o.bs 
27.44446 
 9.224412 
65 
 
n/a n/a 
Full Price 
(Buy it Now) 
 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N.o.bs 
30.60375 
 9.206060 
65 
 
n/a n/a 
 
 
 
TABLE III 
Weekend/Weekday eBay Final Auction Prices 
 Total Weekend Weekday 
Final Price 
(Auctions) 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N.o.bs 
25.32985 
 9.093804 
594 
 
23.97198 
 9.332638 
247 
 
26.29640 
 8.806487 
347 
 
Final Full Price 
(Auctions) 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N.o.bs 
30.39039 
 9.323743 
594 
 
29.01500 
 9.777578 
247 
 
31.36545 
 8.873930 
347 
 
Price 
(Buy it Now) 
 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N.o.bs 
27.44446 
 9.224412 
65 
 
29.25036 
 9.849078 
28 
 
26.07784 
 8.605893 
37 
 
Full Price 
(Buy it Now) 
 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N.o.bs 
30.60375 
 9.206060 
65 
 
32.96630 
 9.586421 
27 
 
28.87973 
 8.643051 
37 
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Figure 18 
Price Over Time 
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TABLE IV 
Total, Weekend, and Weekday Means and Standard Deviations for all 14 Online Retailers 
 Total Weekend Weekday 
Toys “R” Us Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
9.990000 
0.000000 
 
9.990000 
0.000000 
 
9.990000 
0.000000 
 
Walmart Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
8.000000 
0.000000 
 
8.000000 
0.000000 
 
8.000000 
0.000000 
 
eToys Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
11.69732 
3.809488 
 
11.75471 
3.929526 
 
11.65667 
3.806935 
 
Kimmy Shop Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
26.15883 
4.464487 
 
25.53545 
3.133398 
 
25.53545 
3.133398 
 
Digitech Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
43.62461 
16.64433 
 
43.46094 
16.44834 
 
43.74364 
16.97402 
 
Dragostand-Bakugan Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
29.12526 
8.868978 
 
29.61375 
8.485697 
 
28.77000 
9.218283 
 
Superhero Toys Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
31.13474 
10.55740 
 
31.30250 
10.27505 
 
31.01273 
10.87452 
 
Wall of Fame Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
39.96183 
14.27583 
 
38.95552 
14.66162 
 
40.65667 
14.13984 
 
Virtual King Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
37.62158 
13.20287 
 
36.86500 
12.68413 
 
38.17182 
13.68631 
 
Cozcorp Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
23.77961 
10.11902 
 
23.54531 
9.874310 
 
23.95000 
10.40349 
 
Toy Store Inc. Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
29.34474 
11.65902 
 
28.92750 
11.27068 
 
29.64818 
12.05362 
 
Toy Wiz Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
31.46890 
12.95802 
 
31.58375 
12.80337 
 
31.37927 
13.23543 
 
Discount Anime Toys Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
46.46684 
10.19761 
 
45.73625 
10.92736 
 
46.99818 
9.726758 
 
Imperial Outpost Toys Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
24.37095 
5.920103 
 
22.65667 
6.082763 
 
25.65667 
 5.710172 
 
Total Mean 
Std. Dev. 
 
29.15503 
15.48063 
 
28.81047 
15.19718 
 
29.40762 
15.69421 
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Figure 19 
Results of EViews Full Price Regressed on Dummies for Days of the Week  
 
 
Figure 20 
Difference Between  Coefficient of Day of the Week Dummies and Full Price Sample Mean 
(eBay)  
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Figure 21 
Cumulative Price Change by Day of the Week for the 14 Online Retailers over the Entire Sample 
Period  
 
Figure 22 
Full Price Regressed on Dummy Variables for Each Day of the Week 
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Figure 23 
Difference Between  Coefficient of Day of the Week Dummies and Price Sample Mean for 9 
retailers (excluding, Toys "R' Us, eToys, Walmart, KimmyShop, and Imperial Outpost Toys)  
 
 
 
Figure 24 
Weekly Percent of Auction Listings that Received at Least One Bid 
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Figure 25 
Number of Bids Per Auction Over Time 
 
 
Figure 26 
Daily Average Full Price 
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Figure 27 
EViews OLS Regression Results of the Number of Bids Per Auction Regressed on Peak Demand Dummy 
and Full Starting Price 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28 
EViews OLS Regression Results of the Coefficient of Variation Regressed on Peak Demand Dummy  
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Figure 29 
EViews GLS Regression Results of the Coefficient of Variation Regressed on Peak Demand Dummy 
 
 
Figure 30 
Weekly Average Full Price and Coefficient of Variation  
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Figure 31 
EViews Regression Results of the Coefficient of Variation Regressed on Weekend Dummy 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE V 
Week by Week (Monday-Sunday) Statistics (Full Price) 
  Avg Full Price Max Min StDev StDev/Avg 
Oct28-Nov1 23.08 27 16.5 2.643673 0.114544 
Nov2-Nov8 24.48 52.95 18 5.119838 0.209144 
Nov9-Nov15 35.49 50.95 22.24 5.70145 0.160649 
Nov16-Nov22 38.54 52.95 22.75 5.725024 0.148548 
Nov23-Nov29 40.54 51.17 31.5 4.449776 0.109763 
Nov30-Dec6 34.61 47.95 22.5 6.058628 0.175054 
Dec7-Dec13 26.57 40.7 17.5 4.592126 0.172831 
Dec14-Dec20 19.45 27.95 12.5 4.073469 0.209433 
Dec21-Dec27 18.21 21.45 14.94 2.411363 0.13242 
Dec28-Jan3 19.29 49.98 13.24 9.49855 0.492408 
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